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Abstract
From the perspective of the information revolution and based on the methodology put forward 
by the Telecommunications Law Indicators for Comparative Studies (TLICS) Model published 
in 2011 and 2012, this paper builds on the federative indicator used by the literature on de-
pendence of economic development on ICT to answer the following research question: What 
indicators better represent the institutional federative background of eight representative 
Latin American countries for the ICT comparative research? Six sets of federative indicators 
on revenue, fiscal transfer, regulation, adjudication, planning, and media are put together to 
compare the Latin American federative environment as a groundwork for the ICT comparative 
research. The empirical universe of the paper encompassed eight countries that formed a 
potpourri of four officially unitary countries — Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay —, and four 
federative countries — Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela —, that account for 82% of 
the Latin American surface area, 81% of its population, and 92% of its GNI (World Bank Data 
2011). The article is organized in three main parts. A detailed description of the ICT federative 
indicators of the TLICS model and their underpinning concepts is performed in the first part. 
The second part applies these variables to the aforementioned Latin American countries. The 
third part delves into the comparison of the countries analyzed by means of categorizing 
the differences and commonalities revealed by those indicators. As a main outcome, based 
on data collected from the institutional background of those countries, we found clusters of 
commonalities between federative and non-federative countries that support the assumption 
that the sole reference to a single federative category, as opposed to the use of 
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atomized indicators, cannot provide a real picture of their institutional background for ICT 
and development comparative purposes.
Keywords: comparative regulatory models; federalism; Latin America; Telecommunications 
Law Indicators for Comparative Studies (TLICS Model).
The three features of Federalism
Besides the practical importance of the federal ideal to deal with multicultural and multi-
national polities that answers for some 40 percent1 of the world’s population (Watts 2002), 
materializing the prophetic Proudhon’s age of federations2, and the third globalization 
wave of legal thought (Kennedy 2006), a variety of federalism facets have been built 
alongside social sciences analyses on state, power, and legitimacy. It is also well-known 
that federalism comes in many varieties and contexts (Anderson 2008). In the last decade, 
the literature on federalism has investigated a plethora of federative features portrayed 
in Table 1 below, which shows three main characteristics of federalism: (i) national sov-
ereignty; (ii) institutionalized and autonomous subnational governance; (iii) national and 
subnational mutually dependent powers.
Table 1: Last decade literature review on federalism main features
1 That percentage is deduced by Watts (2002) taking account of such examples as Canada, the United States and 
Mexico in North America, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina in South America, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Belgium 
and Spain in Europe, Russia in Europe and Asia, Australia, India, Pakistan and Malaysia in Asia, and Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
and South Africa in Africa.
2 The reference in the text points to the well-known assertion that “the twentieth century will open the age of fede-
rations, or else humanity will undergo another purgatory of a thousand years” (Proudhon 1863, 68–69)
Redes.Com n°9  |  213
latin ameRiCan fedeRative vaRiables foR iCt and develoPment ReseaRCh: a ComPaRison between aRgentina, bRazil, Chile, 
Colombia, mexiCo, PeRu, uRuguay, and venezuela
Among the studies that describe federalism as recognition of the Union’s central 
institutions, Goldstein (2001) examines the evolution of legitimacy and authority for 
centralized institutions in the European Union by contrasting the broad acceptance of the 
European Court of Justice decision-making power with the not so smooth development of 
federal institutions in the sixteenth century experience of the United Dutch provinces, the 
pre-Civil War experience in the United States, and the post-1848 experience of the Swiss 
Federation. According to that study, the existence of strong centralized institutions and the 
lack of a long-term history of subnational resistance in the European Union, as opposed to 
the cases of the U.S., Switzerland, and Netherlands, qualify the European Union experience 
as an exceptional success of federative enterprise. Historical analyses on integrity and 
sub-units resistance to a central power are not unusual. McKay (2001) argues that the 
European Union reproduces a common pattern of confederations turning into federations. 
From his point of view, that common heritage makes the U.S., Switzerland, and Canada 
experiences important benchmarks for the analysis of the European Union federal system. 
Goldstein and McKay put forward a perception of federal systems previously described in 
classics, such as the well-known constitutional history of Bernard Schwartz (1973) on the 
process of reshaping the American Constitution in the period between 1835 and 1877. He 
posits that the American federation was finally stabilized as a new Constitution emerged 
from the Civil War and the Reconstruction years. The amendments thereof provided for 
basic new rights and, most and foremost, for their federalization, as enforcement of civil 
rights would then also become a Union function. The U.S. would finally become a nation, 
instead of a mere confederation, only after federal predominance asserts itself over state 
traditional functions. Schwartz reaffirms the classical view on federalism, which lies on 
a strong bond between the subnational juridical entities and the national identity. The 
classical literature on the concept of federalism defines it as a set of political and juridical 
principles in opposition to the concept of international alliance or confederation (Schmitt 
2008, 381–395, Karmis and Norman 2005). Confederation is perceived as a contractual 
relation that obligates a state to go to war in a particular instance without interfering 
with its political status and its constitution, while federation lies upon the concept of 
federal state as a public law subject dependent upon a public law constitution derived 
from the constitution-making power. That bond is, by definition, a constitutional one. 
Simeon (2009), for example, addresses the adoption of federal or federalist regimes by 
way of reviewing models of successful federative experiences and their constitutional 
design and constitution-making processes. His focus on formal institutional changes 
reveals the effects of informal processes on the functioning of federal systems, such as 
legal and regulatory underpinning values, interpretations of the constitution by the courts, 
intergovernmental accords, agreements, and concordats, changes in party systems and 
alliances, and changes in fiscal arrangements. Non-constitutional renewals may reshape 
a given country’s federal framework when formal constitutional reform proves out of 
reach (Lazar 1998). Even when formal changes are under the spotlights, as in the devolu
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tion process of the United Kingdom, the road to federalization raises questions 
of shared citizenship and core values of unity that were previously celebrated through 
pro-welfare state centralized policies (Jeffery and Wincott 2006). Therefore, the assertion 
above should slightly be rephrased: the bond between national and subnational units in 
a federation is, by definition, a constitutional-oriented one that may rest upon a federal 
supremacy clause, a subset of federal clauses, or informal processes and decisions portraying 
federal institutions. In any case, comparative analyses are bound to pay attention to more 
than just a formal constitutional provision that broadcasts a federal or unitary identity. 
Rather it must dig deeper into the institutional variables of federalism. One set of those 
institutional variables is addressed in the TLICS model, namely the legal and regulatory 
framework and its underpinning values conveyed in courts’ interpretations.
Although the descriptions of federalism as federal predominance and its under-
pinning shared values are present in classical and recent studies, the other facet of the 
federal scheme is nevertheless even more ubiquitous. On the other side of the description 
of federalism as federal predominance lies the autonomy of subnational governance. It 
should be noted that the existence of subnational governance is a key aspect of federal 
systems, but political experiences with federalism will answer in different ways the ques-
tion of how much and what kind of administrative and financial prerogatives should be 
devolved to subnational units. They may also answer those questions differently in accord 
with time as described in the pendulum-like trajectory of centralized and decentralized 
administration of the Russian federal history (Sharafutdinova 2009). Given that federal 
features differ in time, institutional variables of federalism must be time-sensitive as 
well. One of the main characteristics of subnational governance is the existence of re-
gional institutionalized organizations that undermine secessionist movements as proposed 
in Greer (2007) by analyzing nationalism, self-government, and regional autonomy in 
Scotland and Catalonia. Besides the federal myth as a unity of usually multi-ethnic and 
multi-national states, the three remaining factors proposed by Kavalski and Zolkos (2008) 
needed to avoid federal failure — democratization, complex identity, and re-constitutive 
flexibility — deal with subnational empowerment. That empowerment is nonetheless a 
federal feature as long as it functions as a preferable choice when compared to seces-
sion. It is even possible to find defendants of a procedural model of secession arguing for 
its constitutional enshrinement in stable federal states qualified as liberal democracies 
(Jovanovic 2007). Falleti (2010) proposes that the sequence in which decentralization 
reforms unfold — administrative, fiscal, and political types — determines the achievable 
empowerment of subnational governments. Thus, empowerment of subnational units 
is a widely mentioned federal characteristic, making federal identity dependent upon 
specific features, such as: (i) fiscal sustainability, as the ability of governments to meet 
existing spending commitments with existing resources (Ward and Dadayan 2009); (ii) 
power devolution to subnational units, as a real and nearly universal trend since the early 
1990s in sub-Saharan Africa, despite informal recentralization movements that deliber-
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ately strengthened local government at the expense of regional autonomy (Fessha and 
Kirkby 2008), a possibility the like of which Dickovick (2006) describes, using evidences 
from Peru, Brazil, and South Africa, as strategic decisions designed to favor one level of 
subnational government to the detriment of another; (iii) municipalization, as a second-
order devolution of power and authority from states to their local governments in need 
of integrative actors to match the empirical data and managers/legislators’ perceptions 
of state centralization experienced in the United States (Bowman and Kearney 2011); (iv) 
political safeguards of federalism, which were rejected by studies on the use of coercive 
tools by the federal government, yet re-examined by Nicholson-Crotty (2008) as a likely 
possibility during election cycles, which create an intermittent safeguard of state authority; 
(v) legislative self-restraint on exercising preemption powers that might be responsible 
for depriving state governments from the means to exercise their reserved powers in 
the federal system (Zimmerman 2007); (vi) ethno-federalism as regional autonomy to 
minorities in countries with ethno-linguistic diversity or “fractionalized States”, which, 
according to Charron (2009), outperforms its unitary rivals for each quality of government 
indicators; (vii) consistent organization of subnational powers, namely the assertion that a 
federal polity is an arrangement of separation of powers in its constituent units (Cameron 
and Falleti 2005). They all have in common the focus on subnational empowerment and 
show that institutional variables of federalism must address both national sovereignty 
and subnational governance issues.
Centralization and decentralization factors present in federations and quasi-federal 
systems are traditionally described as the two fundamental dilemmas of federalism (Riker 
1964). The first dilemma faces the question of what prevents the national government 
from destroying federalism by overwhelming the authority of its constituent units, while 
the second dilemma tackles the questions of what prevents the constituent units from 
engaging in free-riding and other causes of failure to cooperate that lead to political 
disintegration. Although the two tendencies of centralization and decentralization serve 
as benchmarks against which federal systems can be judged, they are only fragmented 
aspects of a broader phenomenon: the cooperation between different levels of public law 
subjects, which reveals the central idea of federalism as an intergovernmental system.
As prolific as this discussion on the two dilemmas of federalism unfolds — national 
or subnational predominance —, it pales when compared with the third main feature of 
federalism based on interdependent allocation of powers between national and sub-
national units. In fact, the third feature of federalism works to ameliorate the federal 
system by mitigating the federal dilemma between centralization and decentralization 
to affirm that federal institutions may be designed to build a self-enforcing federalism 
toward a sustainable cooperative federation (Figueiredo Jr., McFaul and Weingast 2007). 
Papillon (2012) points to the importance of analyzing the policy-level dynamics of 
tribal governments in the United States and Canada as multilevel governance regimes 
grounded in both constitutional rights and federal self-government 
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legislation, although differing in their institutional legacies. In both countries, 
by engaging in multilevel governance exercises through tribal self-determination, fed-
eral recognition of tribal sovereignty has not weakened their federal regime, rather 
reinforced the process of assimilation to the institutional framework of the dominant 
society. Multilevel governance theory posits that the diffusion of policy process at the 
core of federal systems leads to growing interdependency between governing actors 
and, consequently, to the replacement of formal decision process by cooperation and 
coordination mechanisms. There are two mains consequences for that tendency: for 
one, national and subnational governments do not play inside watertight jurisdictional 
orders anymore; for two, national and subnational governments no longer fully control 
the outcomes of their decision-making process, that is, in principle, an interdependent 
one. A set of essays on the Spanish new decentralized state (Nieto 2008) deals with the 
“estado autonómico” established by the constitution of 1978, focusing on institutional 
mechanisms for intergovernmental relations designed to stabilize the Spanish model of 
cooperative federalism, such as joint plans, programs, commissions and conferences, and 
financing systems, transfers and subsidies between national government and subnational 
autonomous communities. From the perspective of the influence of public input into 
governmental policymaking, Schneider, Jacoby and Lewis (2010) posit that the American 
public is able to clearly identify its preferences for intergovernmental policy responsibili-
ties across a range of policy areas. Public opinion in the U.S. toward policy responsibili-
ties differs in accord with governmental levels, be them programmatic activities of the 
national, state, or local governments, and is related to the relative efforts of the various 
governmental levels within the respective policy areas. By way of dividing responsibili-
ties across different levels of government, federal mechanisms of intergovernmental 
policy has matched in the U.S. with the actual public attitudes and gave citizens more 
opportunity to influence the decision-making process (Schneider, Jacoby and Lewis 
2010). Although the existence of distribution of powers among national and subnational 
governments be an essential feature of intergovernmental relations when related to 
the same substantive area — public transportation, crime, urban development, health 
care, environmental protection, elderly assistance, education, unemployment, response 
to natural disasters, economic development, energy, ICT, and so forth —, the key aspect 
of the federal intergovernmental model lies on the concept of balanced distribution 
of powers, which is of main concern for the literature on intergovernmental relations 
of federalism focused on the influence of political and legal reforms and crisis over 
the balance of intergovernmental shared power (Gamkhar and Pickerill 2011). The key 
concept of intergovernmental relations refers to their balance. The web-shaped structure 
of a multilevel government is also central to the idea of federalism, as demonstrated 
by eight essays on multilevel/networked governance systems from the viewpoint of 
municipalities in Spain, Switzerland, Australia, France, Germany, Mexico, South Africa, 
and the United States (Lazar and Leuprecht 2007). It is also important to know that the 
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multilevel governance in a federal system faces different spatial scales that go beyond the 
traditional dyad of federal and state spheres to encompass subunits relations (Gamkhar 
and Pickerill 2012) or subunits alone, such as regional metropolitan areas (Miller and 
Lee 2009) and cities that must respect, for example, in the U.S., the Dillon’s Rule, which 
binds them to state rules under a complex environment of political calculus (Krueger 
and Bernick 2009). From a mutually dependent perspective, both higher-level entities 
influence lower-level ones, and lower-level public law subjects influence higher-level 
governance, such as the state influence in the national policy process (Dinan 2008), as 
happens with the practice of front-loading in the United States (Busch 2008). Mere 
centralization or decentralization policy will be a federative one only if new national 
or subnational initiatives be enacted as intergovernmental administration (Conlan 
and Posner 2011). Mutually dependent national and subnational governance is rather 
one of the strengths of federalism than its limitation, as posed by Hollander (2009) in 
his examination of the consequences of Australia’s quest for eliminating duplication, 
overlap and redundancy in the Australia’s New Federalism agenda of the early 1990s. 
The consequence of federalism in shaping centralization and decentralization policies 
is to bind them to the central concept of intergovernmental equations. The book of 
fifteen essays edited by Conlan and Posner (2008) on how to improve the manage-
ment of federalism to make it more responsive and effective sees federalism precisely 
as intergovernmental machinery. As mutually dependent machinery, it also allows for 
different and creative policy designs that pairs federal funding with state flexibility 
and influences nationwide partisan politics (Grogan and Rigby 2008). Effectiveness 
of government responses to extreme events, such as those of September 11th, 2001, 
depends on the federal intergovernmental system performance. Comfort (2002) argues 
that the performance of federal intergovernmental relations can be tackled by the theory 
of complex adaptive systems, while Roberts (2008) claims for an alternative way to 
pure centralization and decentralization by defending dispersed federalism of federal 
agencies responsible for emergency management and homeland security as a method 
prone to better take into account location specificity. Influence of state programmatic 
expertise on the federal decision-making process depends on the previous alignment 
between federal and state policy interests, that is, intergovernmental relations. When 
this intergovernmental alignment does not exist, Esterling (2008) concludes that the 
federative scheme fails to deliver its benefits of mutual support for the public good. 
The privileged position of subnational governments in learning with the experiment 
with policies depends on the federal feature of intergovernmental alignment. Hence, 
to thoroughly analyze centralization and decentralization processes, it is necessary to 
understand the complexity of subsequent distributional conflicts among national and 
subnational governments as described by Montero (2001) in the Argentine, Brazilian, 
Spain, and Mexican cases. Intergovernmental relations also occupy the play’s center 
stage when one deals with 
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the New Regionalism of international law studies (Pureza 2012) that address 
intergovernmental institutions designed to mediate the relations between, e.g., the 
European social model based on indirect salaries, universal public services and social 
rights, and the global economic and financial order. By overcoming the fragilities of 
the contractual-oriented international law through the emergence of jus cogens and 
erga omnes obligations, international institutions have been able to mimic national 
public law frameworks, making them susceptible to federal categories of centralization, 
decentralization, and intergovernmental dependence. The literature on federalism shows 
it is undisputable that the categories alone of centralization and decentralization are 
insufficient for depicting the federative phenomenon, as a whole set of independent 
features also emerge from intergovernmental relations.
TLICS Model threefold analysis of Federalism
As long as the first two characteristics portray the inherent tension between central-
ization and decentralization within federalism, the third one sums-up the meaning of 
federalism as intergovernmental affairs. Therefore, as described in Table 1, institutional 
variables of federalism will invariably fit under the central idea of a system in which 
two forces cohabit: centralization and decentralization. What makes federalism so 
rich and interesting for social science studies is precisely its instable position between 
tendencies of national sovereignty and subnational autonomy. To understand federal-
ism, it is imperative to adopt a conceptual framework that depicts both centripetal and 
centrifugal forces inherent to any description of federal systems, and the transversal 
arrow that connects them: multilevel intergovernmental relations. Unity, autonomy, 
conflict, and cooperation are not incompatible concepts under the scrutiny of subna-
tional interdependence as multilevel governance leading to interrelated national and 
subnational political decisions.
The Telecommunications Law Indicators for Comparative Studies (Aranha 2011) 
shows a set of key legal aspects of institutional variables useful for the ICT and devel-
opment literature. Federative variables were found through that method in (Aranha, 
Lopes, et al. 2012), following a recent international movement focused on the juridical 
dimension of institutional variables for comparison purposes in projects such as the 
European initiative on Harmonization of ICT Policies, Legislation and Regulatory Proce-
dures. The TLICS model focuses on indicators visible in the countries’ legal frameworks 
and courts interpretation. This article builds upon the main features of federalism, by 
applying legal-based institutional variables to Latin American selected countries, and 
organizing them in clusters of centralization and decentralization under a set of six 
indicators on the dimensions of revenue, fiscal transfer, regulation, adjudication, plan-
ning, and media industry.
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Building on insights of the literature on federal systems, especially from the per-
spective of the undisputable dynamic and ever-changing process of the centralization 
and decentralization phenomenon, as described in the U.S. intergovernmental relations 
between 1995 and 2005 (Weissert, Stenberg and Cole 2009), the federative variables 
developed by the TLICS model depict national and subnational features of ICT-based 
federative principles that encompass not only national and subnational predominance, 
but also the intergovernmental relations. This model allows for comparisons in a three-
fold way: centralization, decentralization, and interdependence as the coexistence of 
centralized and decentralized commands in the legal framework that account for a 
necessary interaction for planning the ICT sector in a national-subnational environment. 
From this perspective, both centralized and decentralized features of federalism may 
coexist in a given legal framework, pointing out to an intergovernmental imperative.
To avoid cherry-picking the data in order to reach a foreordained conclusion, this 
study adopted the TLICS model hermeneutical approach of norm-governed behavior 
by strictly binding to pre-designed forms1 and 43 juridical variables for each country 
analyzed (Aranha, Lopes, et al. 2012). A set of eight countries representative of the 
Latin American experience were then analyzed: four officially unitary countries (Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay); and four self-declared federative countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela). They account for 82% of the Latin American surface 
area, 81% of its inhabitants, and 92% of its GNI (World Bank Data 2011). Each country 
was scrutinized in four sectors — telecommunications, broadcast, broadband, and e-
commerce — according to the following dimensions: revenue, divided in taxing federalism 
(Indicator 1.1) and administrative fees (Indicator 1.2); fiscal transfer, divided in sectorial 
funds (Indicator 2.1) and local treasures (Indicator 2.2); regulation, divided in regula-
tory jurisdiction (Indicator 3.1) and contingent regulation (Indicator 3.2); adjudication, 
divided in public law jurisdiction (Indicator 4.1) and private law jurisdiction (Indicator 
4.2); planning, divided in national ICT development plans indicator (5.1), and subna-
tional ICT development plans indicator (5.2); and finally media industry, manifested in 
one indicator of content quota (Indicator 6.1), which exceptionally contemplates only 
three sectors, that is, broadcast, pay TV, and Internet. A thorough description of each 
indicator is implemented in Aranha, Lopes, et al. (2012).
By juxtaposing TLICS model against theories on federalism and the historical 
plasticity of federal arrangements, we addressed features derived from federalism and 
useful for comparative analyses on ICT and development in a threefold way: the ex-
istence of exclusive centralized juridical features on a given dimension; the existence 
of exclusive decentralized juridical aspects on a given dimension; and the existence of 
an interdependent system of attributions and countervailing trends among national 
and subnational units.
1 The TLICS model forms are available at www.getel.org/TLICSmodel and the 43 forms of each country analyzed are 
available at www.getel.org/TLICSdata.
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Policy-dynamics and legal framework: designing time-sensitive variables
Focusing on institutional variables from the exclusive viewpoint of constitutional 
design is broadly criticized in the aforementioned literature of the last decade on 
federalism by a twofold reason: for one, constitutional designs are usually viewed as 
steadfast, unchangeable propositions, regardless the fact of unstoppable changing of 
their meaning through the interpretation of the courts; for two, constitutional designs 
are perceived as exclusive sources for institutional identification of a given country. 
Nonetheless, neither constitutional designs are free from hermeneutical changes of 
meanings, nor figure as exclusive sources of legal identity of institutional variables 
in a given country. TLICS model focuses precisely on the changing nature of the legal 
framework and interpretation of the courts to face the fact that federations vary in 
their institutional presentations in many historical, economic, social, political, and 
demographic aspects, including the underlying values that inform their federalist 
discourse (Burgess 2006). The variety of federal models mirrors the variety of their 
institutional variables. In that sense, TLICS model adopts time-sensitive indicators, as 
legal, policy basis, and regulatory instruments are displayed in the aforementioned 
forms in accord with their enactment, so that it remains clear the timeframe during 
which a given policy, legal instrument, regulatory document, or interpretation came 
into force.
Latin American federative indicators according to TLICS Model
By applying the six sets of the TLICS model federative indicators on revenue, fiscal 
transfer, regulation, adjudication, planning, and media on the Latin American context, 
we found several behaviors independent from the official categorization of each country 
as federal or unitary systems. The empirical universe of the paper encompassed eight 
countries that formed a potpourri of four federative countries — Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Venezuela —, and four officially unitary countries — Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
and Uruguay —, that account for 82% of the Latin American surface area, 81% of its 
population, and 92% of its GNI (World Bank Data 2011).
The charts below show each country’s centralized, decentralized, interdepen-
dent, and absent federative features pertaining telecom, broadcast, broadband, and 
e-commerce sectors. The colors represent the predominance of federal and unitary 
features of the set of dimensions described above: centralization as blue; decentraliza-
tion as red; national-subnational interdependence as green; and absence of regulation 
as purple. The first set of four charts corresponds to officially federal countries, while 
the set below it represents officially unitary countries.
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Table 1: Last decade literature review on federalism main features
Stacked bar charts depicting ICT federative variables per sector (telecom, broadcast, broadband, and 
e-commerce), in which the blue color represents national centralization features, red represents sub-
national decentralization features, green represents national-subnational interdependence, and purple 
represents the absence of regulation. Data were analyzed using TLICS model tables available at www.
getel.org/TLICSforms
The comparison between the two sets of four federal and four unitary countries 
shows that although Peru and Uruguay pay tribute to their constitutional character-
ization as unitary systems, the remaining countries do not follow the script written in 
their constitutions. There is a clear predominance of centralized features in all countries 
regardless of their federal or unitary title, except for Colombia, which shows in all sectors 
shared centralized and decentralized features. Argentina and Mexico portray themselves 
as mostly centralized in the telecom, broadcast, and broadband sectors, while Brazil and 
Venezuela, although showing more decentralized features than the previous two, also 
mostly deny their federative heritage in those sectors. More importantly, when we focus 
on one sector alone, such as telecom, only Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela figure among 
those partially federative, while the remaining countries, regardless of their qualification 
as federal or unitary systems, show the predominance of centralized features.
The previous figure and the next one offer a broader view of ICT federative variables 
per sector — telecom, broadcast, broadband, and e-commerc (Figure 1) — and per dimen-
sion — revenue, fiscal transfer, regulation, adjudication, planning, and media industry 
(Figure 2). A cross section of the ICT federative variables by dimensions brings light to 
another ICT cleavage of the Latin American countries analyzed.
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Figure 2: Federative variables per dimension in Latin America  
according to TLICS model
Stacked bar charts depicting ICT federative variables per dimension (revenue, fiscal transfer, regulation, 
adjudication, planning, and media industry), in which the blue color represents national centralization 
features, red represents subnational decentralization features, green represents national-subnational 
interdependence, and purple represents the absence of regulation. Data were analyzed using TLICS 
model tables available at www.getel.org/TLICSforms
The pervasive decentralized features present in all sectors in Argentina, Chile, 
and Venezuela (Figure 1) correspond to specific dimensions in the Figure 2 cleavage, 
that is the revenue dimension in Argentina, the regulation dimension in Chile, and 
the dimensions of revenue and adjudication in Venezuela. In terms of adjudication, 
only Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia show decentralized features, while the same 
amount of decentralization is shown for the regulation dimension in the cases of 
Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. On another topic, while Uruguay is strongly centralized 
in the telecom, broadcast, and broadband sectors (Figure 1), it is absent of central-
ized features in the fiscal and media dimensions (Figure 2). Mexico’s predominance 
of centralized features (Figure 1) is in contrast with the shared characteristics of 
centralized and decentralized features in the regulation and fiscal transfer dimen-
sions (Figure 2). Brazil otherwise shows non-predominant decentralized features in 
all sectors (Figure 1), while when it is analyzed through another cleavage (Figure 2), 
it is predominantly federative in the regulation and adjudication dimensions. Ar-
gentina proudly defies its federative identity in Figure 1, especially for the telecom 
and broadband sectors, but when it is depicted in Figure 2, its revenue dimension 
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shows a predominant federative country. Venezuela, in turn, is a good showcase in 
which the TLICS model demonstrates its benefits for comparative analyses. In Figure 
1, Venezuela shows a semi-federal presentation in all sectors, while in Figure 2, the 
dimensions cleavage shows a strongly centralized country in terms of fiscal transfer, 
regulation, and planning, not to mention that decentralized features shown in Figure 
1 correspond mostly to Venezuela’s pervasive characteristic of decentralized variables 
present in the adjudication dimension (Figure 2).
The charts above (Figures 1 and 2) are still dealing, though, with broad descrip-
tions, instead of making use of all the benefits offered by granulated data on revenue, 
fiscal transfer, regulation, adjudication, planning, and media dimensions available 
in the TLICS model for the Latin American context. If we look at the data from the 
perspective of specific indicators on taxation, administrative fees, fiscal transfer to 
sectorial funds, fiscal transfer to local treasuries, regulatory jurisdiction, contingent 
regulation, public law adjudication, private law adjudication, national ICT develop-
ment plans, subnational ICT development plans, and content quota, we end up with 
the following set of charts.
Figure 3: Federative indicators in Latin America according to TLICS model
Stacked bar charts depicting TLICS model federative indicators, in which the blue color represents 
national centralization features, red represents subnational decentralization features, green represents 
national-subnational interdependence, and purple represents the absence of regulation.
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Figure 3 tells a different story putting together Argentina, Colombia, and Ven-
ezuela as decentralized countries according to the tax indicator, while all countries 
behave mostly as if they were unitary countries according to the administrative 
fees indicator. Except for Uruguay, all countries depict a centralized approach to 
fiscal transfers to sectorial funds, as they show a strong predominance of cen-
tralized variables in that indicator paired with an absence of variables of fiscal 
transfer to local treasuries. Nonetheless, as we compare side by side the indicators 
of fiscal transfers and taxation, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia match 
as federalized countries pertaining fiscal federalism. The regulatory jurisdiction 
indicator puts all countries together as centralized countries, with a slight differ-
ence at the indicators of Brazil and Mexico, which can only be understood by a 
more atomized variable that separates e-commerce from the telecom, broadcast, 
and broadband sectors. Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico have similar regimes 
of decentralized contingent regulation, as an indicator that shows regulation on 
ICT by local regulatory bodies not directly entitled with sectorial competence on 
ICT such as ICT consumer rights regulation, antitrust regulation, electromagnetic 
health hazard regulation, ICT infrastructure limits derived from land use regula-
tion — zoning ordinances and building requirements —, environmental regulation or 
the like. By the same token, Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay figure as centralized 
countries according to the contingent regulation indicator, while Peru stands alone 
as a semi-federal country according to the same indicator. The indicators of public 
and private law adjudication portray Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay as 
centralized countries. Colombia and Venezuela stand apart with their accentuated 
federal features in that indicator, while Brazil stands alone as a centralized country 
for public law adjudication as opposed to a federalized country for the indicator of 
private law adjudication. When we focus on the planning dimension, Chile stands 
alone as predominantly absent, while Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay show signs of 
centralization, and Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia show predominantly 
centralized features for the indicator of national ICT development plans. The content 
quota indicator, as electoral, educational, cultural or local independent content 
quota, clearly separates the four officially unitary countries from the four federal 
ones by depicting the absence of content regulation in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and 
Uruguay, while Mexico and Venezuela show a minor importance of centralized 
content quota policies, and, finally, Argentina and Brazil figure as predominantly 
centralized countries as far as content quota is concerned.
As we dig deeper into the data, the charts below (Figure 4) show a comparison 
between the eight Latin American countries in the telecom, broadcast, broadband, 
and e-commerce sectors paired with the indicators of taxation in the first row, 
administrative fees in the second row, regulatory jurisdiction in the third row, and 
contingent regulation in the fourth row.
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Figure 4: Federative indicators per sector in Latin America according to TLICS model
Stacked bar charts depicting ICT federative indicators of taxation, administrative fees, regulatory juris-
diction, and contingent regulation per sector (telecom, broadcast, broadband, e-commerce), in which 
the blue color represents national centralization features, red represents subnational decentralization 
features, green represents national-subnational interdependence, and purple represents the absence 
of regulation. The four countries positioned on the left side of the radar chart are officially federal 
systems, while the four remaining countries fit the unitary system legal framework. Data were analyzed 
using TLICS model tables available at www.getel.org/TLICSforms.
The same set of charts of Figure 4 is presented in Figure 5 as radar charts for easier 
visual identification of commonalities and differences.
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Figure 5: Federative indicators per sector in Latin America according to TLICS model
Radar charts depicting ICT federative indicators of taxation, administrative fees, regulatory jurisdiction, 
and contingent regulation per sector (telecom, broadcast, broadband, e-commerce), in which the blue 
color represents national centralization features, red represents subnational decentralization features, 
green represents national-subnational interdependence, and purple represents the absence of regula-
tion. The four countries positioned on the left side of the radar chart are officially unitary systems, 
while the four remaining countries fit the federal system legal framework. Data were analyzed using 
TLICS model tables available at www.getel.org/TLICSforms.
Figure 5 shows that centralized and decentralized features are distributed among 
countries regardless their formal affiliation to a unitary or federal system. The four coun-
tries positioned on the left side of the radar chart are officially unitary systems, while the 
four remaining countries fit the federal system legal framework. Radar charts show the 
disruptive behavior of countries according to the tax indicator, while all countries behave 
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coherently as unitary ones as we look into the administrative fees indicator. It does not 
really matter whether a country is considered unitary or federal, since all analyzed countries 
behave as centralized ones as far as administrative fees indicator is concerned. The tax 
indicator nevertheless shows a predominance of decentralization features on the right 
side of the charts, which are occupied by federal countries, although in both sides one can 
see centralized and decentralized features as well as absence of governmental interfer-
ence. The absence of federal features is sound for e-commerce in the administrative fees 
and regulatory jurisdiction indicators, but is not dominant in the contingent regulation 
indicator, and virtually disappears in the tax indicator. On another topic, the regulatory
Jurisdiction indicator mostly mimics the administrative fees indicator, while the 
contingent regulation indicator shows shared features of centralization and decentral-
ization regardless countries official presentation as unitary or federal systems. One may 
continue this exercise with all the sectors and indicators adding up to forty four charts, 
but this is enough to portray the picture intended in this article, that proposed to make 
the institutional variable of federalism wide open to the eyes of ICT comparative studies.
We found distinct and independent patterns of centralized and decentralized fea-
tures/variables per sector — telecom, broadcast, broadband, e-commerce —, the absence 
of governmental interdependent relations, except for the planning dimension, and rel-
evant depictions of each country’s federative indicators useful for comparison purposes, 
in which the federal phenomenon is atomized in many different perspectives — tax, fees, 
fiscal transfer, regulation, adjudication, planning, and media industry according to TLICS 
model. The findings of different behaviors according to each indicator shows that TLICS 
model better serve as a framework for a more precise and granulated image of the Latin 
American ICT landscape with special interest for the ICT and development literature.
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